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Abstract
This paper presents an evaluation of the tax-transfer treatment of married couples in 15 EU
countries using the EUROMOD microsimulation model. First, we show that many tax-transfer
schemes in Europe feature negative jointness defined as a situation where the tax rate on one
person depends negatively on the earnings of the spouse. This stands in contrast to the previ-
ous literature on this question, which has focused on a specific form of positive jointness. The
presence of negative jointness is driven by family-based and means-tested transfer programs
combined with tax systems that usually feature very little jointness. Second, we consider the
labor supply distortion on secondary earners relative to primary earners implied by the current
tax-transfer systems, and study the welfare eﬀects of small reforms that change the relative
taxation of spouses. By adopting a small-reform methodology, it is possible to set out a simple
analysis based on more realistic labor supply models than those considered in the existing lit-
erature. We present microsimulations showing that simple revenue-neutral reforms that lower
the tax burden on secondary earners are associated with substantial welfare gains in most coun-
tries. Finally, we consider the tax-transfer implications of marriage and estimate the so-called
marriage penalty. For most countries, we find large marriage penalties at the bottom of the
distribution driven primarily by features of the transfer system.
1 Introduction
The tax treatment of couples has been a debating point throughout the existence of the income
tax. Actual policies have varied over time and across countries. Over the past three decades,
there has been an international trend from joint to individual taxation of husbands and wives,
and today the majority of OECD countries use the individual as the basic unit of taxation.
Under fully individual taxation, tax liability is assessed separately for each family member and
is therefore independent of the income of other individuals living in the household. By contrast,
in a system of fully joint taxation of couples, as operated by for example the United States, tax
liability is assessed at the family level and depends on total family income. Three basic points
have been noted in previous discussions of the choice between individual and joint taxation (e.g.,
Rosen, 1977; Boskin and Sheshinski, 1983; Pechman, 1987).
The first argument is an eﬃciency argument. It starts from the empirical observation that
the secondary earner in a family–typically the wife–tends to have a more elastic labor supply
than the primary earner (e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). A Ramsey-type optimal tax rule
then suggests that the labor income of secondary earners should be taxed at a lower rate than the
labor income of primary earners. This is achieved to a certain degree by a progressive individual
income tax, because primary earners have higher incomes and therefore face higher marginal tax
rates than their spouses. On the other hand, a fully joint income tax creates identical marginal
tax rates across members of the same household and hence does not meet this eﬃciency criterion.
The second argument is that tax systems should be neutral with respect to marriage deci-
sions. This can be viewed as an eﬃciency argument that tax systems should not distort the
marriage market or as a horizontal equity argument that identical couples (married or cohabitat-
ing) should be treated identically for tax purposes. While individual-based taxation is neutral
with respect to marriage, joint tax systems are generically non-neutral. Jointness may penalize
or subsidize marriage depending on the exact design, and the size of penalties/subsidies generally
depends on the distribution of income within the family.
The third argument is an equity argument, taking as its point of departure that welfare is
better measured by family income than individual income. As a result, two families with the
same total income should, other things being the same, pay equal taxes. By the same token, if
one family receives a higher total income than another family, then the first family should face a
higher tax liability than the second one. This equity criterion is satisfied by a joint income tax
that depends on total family income, but not by a progressive individual tax system, because
in that case tax liability depends also on the distribution of incomes within the family.
This paper attempts to shed light on the three issues discussed above. We start by noting
that these issues ultimately pertain to the redistribution scheme as a whole, not just the tax
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system, and we therefore present an integrated treatment of the tax and transfer system. A
recurrent theme in the paper is that the transfer system is a crucial element in understanding
and evaluating redistribution schemes aﬀecting married couples. We also point out that the
focus in previous discussions on the choice between individual tax treatment and joint tax treat-
ment based on family income represents an oversimplification, because real-world redistribution
schemes are almost never fully individual or fully joint. There are two reasons for this. First,
while most countries have adopted individual filing in the tax system, they tend to retain cer-
tain elements of jointness such as the transfer of unused allowances across spouses, dependent
spouse exemptions, etc. Second, transfer systems are nearly always fully joint, because social
benefits are means-tested according to the combined income and assets of the two spouses in the
household. This implies that actual redistribution systems typically combine a form of quasi-
individual taxation with family-based transfer systems, creating a fairly complicated jointness
structure that is diﬀerent from the two polar cases typically analyzed.
This paper presents a comprehensive evaluation of the tax-transfer treatment of married
couples in 15 EU countries. The analysis has three components. First, we carefully map the
nature of jointness in tax-transfer schemes in our sample of countries using the EUROMOD
microsimulation model. EUROMOD is built around country-specific, but partly harmonized,
micro datasets combined with a detailed tax-benefit simulator capturing the full set of institu-
tional features of tax and transfer systems in each country.1 We find that many tax-transfer
schemes in Europe feature negative jointness defined as a situation where the tax rate on one
person depends negatively on the earnings of the spouse. Such a system is opposite to the form
of jointness typically analyzed in the literature–fully joint and progressive taxation–because
such schemes feature a positive interaction between tax rates and spousal earnings and therefore
positive jointness. The presence of negative jointness is driven by family-based and means-tested
transfers combined with individual or almost-individual taxes. To see this, consider a secondary
earner, say the wife, deciding about labor market entry. If she is married to a low-income hus-
band, the family is in the phase-out range of transfer programs, and she will face a high eﬀective
tax rate. On the other hand, if she is married to a high-income husband, the family is beyond
the phase-out range of transfer programs, and she will face a low eﬀective tax rate because the
income tax is individual. Hence, the wife’s tax is declining in the husband’s earnings.
Second, the paper considers the incentives to supply labor for secondary earners relative to
primary earners implied by the existing tax-transfer systems, and studies the welfare eﬀects of
reforms that change the relative taxation of spouses. This issue is separate from the nature
of jointness discussed above: jointness has to do with the relationship between tax rates and
1An introduction to EUROMOD and a descriptive analysis of taxes and transfers in the EU countries has been
provided by Sutherland (2001), Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2003), and Immervoll (2004).
2
spousal earnings (a cross-derivative in the tax function), whereas labor supply incentives have
to do with the relationship between tax liability and own earnings (an own-derivative in the
tax function). Previous work has often discussed the two issues as if they are one and the
same, but we find that the distinction is important in practice. To study the welfare eﬀects of
tax-transfer reform, the paper starts by setting out a simple theoretical model that incorporates
only participation responses, and then turn to a general model that allows for both participation
and hours-of-work responses for both spouses in the household. Microsimulations of diﬀerent
revenue-neutral reforms that reduce the tax burden on secondary earners show that, for both
models and for most countries, a lowering of the tax burden on secondary earners is associated
with substantial welfare gains.
This part of the paper may be seen as an extension of our previous work based on single-
person households (Immervoll et al., 2007) to the case of two-person households. It is also
related to the recent work by Alesina and Ichino (2007), arguing that tax schemes should be
gender-specific with lower rates on females. We do not consider gender-specific taxation as
such (consistent with real-world tax systems that are anonymous and hence gender-blind), but
consider reforms that change the taxation of primary versus secondary earners. We define
primary versus secondary, not in terms of gender, but in terms of relative earnings within
the family–a concept that is correlated with gender.2 Indeed, it is shown that in almost
all countries more than 80% of secondary earners are women, and in some countries more
than 90% of secondary earners are women. Thus, the reforms under consideration strongly
target married women with low earnings or weak labor market attachment without formally
discriminating based on gender. This is important because gender-specific taxation per se would
be unconstitutional in most countries.
Third, the paper explores the distortions in the decision to marry by simulating the size of
marriage penalties resulting from the combined eﬀect of taxes and transfers. The presence of
family-based and means-tested transfers penalizes marriage at the bottom of the distribution,
implying that marriage penalties at the bottom tend to go hand in hand with negative jointness.3
Indeed, we find large marriage penalties at the bottom of the distribution (but not at the top)
in most countries, which raises important questions pertaining to fairness as well as to eﬃciency.
Transfers and taxes that depend on marriage are often accused by conservatives of destroying the
traditional two-parent family and leading to high rates of single motherhood. Although empirical
studies of the eﬀects on marriage and divorce from income taxes (e.g. Alm and Whittington,
2More specifically, the lower-earning spouse in each family is defined as the secondary earner. For one-earner
couples, this obviously implies that the non-working spouse is the secondary earner.
3However, theoretically it is entirely possible to design a negatively joint tax system that subsidizes rather
than penalizes marriage.
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1997, 1999), welfare benefits (e.g., Hoynes 1997a,b; Moﬃtt, 1998), or taxes and benefits combined
(Dickert-Conlin, 1999; Eissa and Hoynes, 2000b) tend to find modest or no eﬀects, the existence
of marriage disincentives continues to be a controversial point of contention.
Most of the literature studying the optimal design of tax and transfer programs and the
evaluation of tax and welfare reform rests on models of single-person households. However, real-
world tax-transfer schemes for a large part redistribute income across families formed around
couples, creating a substantial gap between theory and practice. This has triggered a recent
and growing interest in generalizing the theory of optimal income redistribution to explicitly
deal with couples. For example, Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2007, 2008) explore the optimal
nonlinear taxation of couples as a multi-dimensional screening problem, whereby agents (couples)
are characterized by a multi-dimensional parameter (ability and taste-for-work parameters of
each spouse) that are unobserved by the principal (the government which maximizes social
welfare). They find that, under certain assumptions, optimal incentive schemes feature negative
jointness, which is consistent with our findings for Europe. Recent papers by Brett (2006) and
Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2006) also analyze the optimal taxation of couples as a
multidimensional screening problem. The rest of the literature (e.g. Schroyen, 2003; Alesina
and Ichino, 2007) typically restricts the tax function to be separable (albeit gender-specific),
thereby sidestepping the complexities associated with multi-dimensional screening.
Our paper may be seen as an applied counterpart to these recent theoretical papers. By
focusing on small reforms rather than the optimal system, we are able to set out a tractable
analysis based on more general and realistic labor supply models than the very stylized models
previously considered.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the EUROMOD model.
Section 3 maps out the existing tax-transfer treatment of married couples in our sample of
European countries. Section 4 sets out a joint labor supply model to evaluate reforms aﬀecting
married couples, and presents a microsimulation study of specific reforms that reduce the tax
burden on second-earner participation. Section 5 studies marriage penalties, and Section 6
concludes.
2 Data
Our data source is EUROMOD, a microsimulation model for the EU built around partly homog-
enized micro datasets that include data on earnings, labor force participation and demographics.
The version available for this study relates to 1998 and covers the 15 countries that constituted
the EU at that time. Based on detailed algorithms capturing the full range of institutional
features of tax and transfer systems in each country, the model is able to compute a wide
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range of taxes and benefits for each observation unit in representative samples for the various
countries. The main policy instruments incorporated in EUROMOD are income taxes, social
security contributions (or payroll taxes) paid by employees, benefit recipients, and employers as
well as universal and means-tested social benefits including housing assistance.4 The model fully
accounts for the complicated interaction of diﬀerent types of taxes and benefits with earnings,
assets, employment status, marital status, housing situation and children, and its considerable
level of detail makes it an ideal tool for comparative tax analysis.5
We restrict the sample to married couples where both husband and wife are between 16 and
64 years of age, where the couple as a whole reports positive annual earnings, and where at
least one member of the household has been working the entire year. We exclude those who are
currently receiving pension, early retirement, or disability benefits. In each couple, we define
the primary earner (PE) as the highest-earning member and the secondary earner (SE) as the
lowest-earnings member of the household. Together with our sample restriction, this implies
that, in one-earner couples, the primary earner works the entire year while the secondary earner
is non-employed throughout the year. In two-earner couples, the secondary earner works either
part of or the entire year but always has relatively low earnings.
While we feel that it makes sense to define primary versus secondary earner in terms of
earnings (and indirectly labor market participation), the earnings-based definition is in practice
highly correlated with a gender-based definition. To demonstrate this, Table 1 displays the
share of women among secondary earners according to our definition. We see that, in one-earner
couples, more than 90 percent of secondary earners (non-participants) are women in all countries
except the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom. In two-earner couples, the second-earner
definition is slightly less skewed towards women, so that on average the share of secondary earners
that are women varies between 80 and 90 percent across most of the 15 countries in our sample.
The close relationship between relative earnings within families and gender implies that a purely
earnings-based couple tax function can be targeted to gender without being formally gender-
based. This is important because gender-specific taxation per se would be unconstitutional in
most countries.6
4 In the results reported here, we do not include unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in the calculation of
eﬀective participation tax rates. This is due in part to diﬃculties associated with accounting properly for the
implications of limited UI duration in our static tax rate measures. At a more conceptual level, it is likely that UI
schemes providing insurance against involuntary and temporary job loss have very diﬀerent incentive implications
than poverty alleviation programs oﬀering permanent income guarantees to all non-workers.
5For further information on EUROMOD, the reader is referred to Sutherland (2001) as well as the Internet at
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod
6Despite the economic equivalence between gender-based taxation and aﬃrmative action (which has been
aproved by the courts on many occations), the two policies would be viewed very diﬀerently by the courts. See
Rubenfeld (1997) for a discussion of this point in the context of race.
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3 The Tax-Transfer Treatment of Couples in Europe
Based on EUROMOD, this section maps out the tax-transfer treatment of married couples in
our sample of European countries. As general background, Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix
summarize the most important institutional features of tax and benefit systems aﬀecting married
couples in each country.
It is useful to start by distinguishing between two diﬀerent properties of a tax-transfer
schedule for couples: (i) the relative tax rates on husbands and wives, and (ii) the jointness of
the schedule. In most of the existing literature, these two properties have been studied as if they
are one and the same, with joint taxation being defined as a situation with identical marginal
tax rates on the two spouses and individual taxation being defined as a situation with a higher
marginal tax rate on the primary earner. However, this close relationship between relative tax
rates and jointness is present only under very strong restrictions on the tax schedule. In general,
jointness is related to the cross-relationship between tax rates and spousal earnings (a cross-
derivative in the tax function), whereas tax rates reflect the relationship between tax liability
and own earnings (an own-derivative in the tax function). In principle and in practice, it is
entirely possible to combine forms of jointness with, say, lower tax rates on secondary earners.
To make the discussion precise, it is helpful to define the tax function for couples as T (zp, zs),
where zp denotes primary earnings and zs denotes secondary earnings. Below we often refer to
this as a ‘tax function’, but we want to think of T (.) as the net payment by a couple to the
government embodying taxes as well as transfers. The eﬀective marginal tax rates (including
benefit phase-out) of the two spouses are given by T 0p (zp, zs) and T 0s (zp, zs), and they are of
course important for determining hours worked for those who are working (the intensive margin
of labor supply). Marginal tax rates are shown in Table A3 in the appendix, but this section
focuses instead on a diﬀerent tax rate measure–the participation tax rate. This is a more
interesting tax rate measure because the extensive margin of labor supply is empirically more
important. We define the participation tax rate on a particular family member as the total
change in T (.) as this family member enters into employment as a share of earnings generated
by the entry. In order to calculate participation tax rates, one has to make assumptions about
the sequence of participation choices within the household because, with jointness in the tax-
transfer code, the tax liability change associated with a person entering depends on whether the
spouse is working or not. We make the natural assumption that the primary earner enters first
and the secondary earner enters second. In Section 4.1, we provide a microfoundation for this
model, which has been adopted in many empirical labor supply studies (e.g., Eissa, 1995; Eissa
and Hoynes, 2004).
Under the assumed sequence of labor market entries in the household, the participation tax
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rates on the primary and secondary earners are given by
τp ≡
T (zp, 0)− T (0, 0)
zp
, τ s ≡
T (zp, zs)− T (zp, 0)
zs
. (1)
These tax rates are simulated by EUROMOD in the following way. For the computation of
τ s, we consider the subsample of two-earner couples and start by computing actual taxes net
of transfers T (zp, zs) at each observed earnings pair, accounting for other relevant household
information (place of residence, number of kids, etc.). We then recompute taxes and transfers
in the alternative (hypothetical) situation where the secondary earner does not work, T (zp, 0),
and calculate τ s as in eq. (1). Analogously for τp, we use the sample of one-earner couples to
simulate taxes net of transfers in the original situation, T (zp, 0), and in the alternative situation
where the primary earner is not working, T (0, 0), and then apply formula (1).7
Table 2 shows participation tax rates and labor market outcomes for primary and secondary
earners in each country (averages for each country sample). As one would expect, Scandinavia
and Northern-Continental Europe feature higher overall tax rate levels than Anglo-Saxon and
Southern European countries. More interestingly, the tax rate on primary earners is higher than
on secondary earners in all but the four Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain). This is a result of the impact of family-based and means-tested welfare benefits,
which are aﬀected more by the first than by the second entrant. We do not observe the same
eﬀect in Southern Europe where welfare benefits are less generous. Although most countries
impose a higher participation tax rate on the primary earner, there are substantial diﬀerences
in the relative rates across countries. In particular, the UK system stands out by being much
more favorable to second-earner participation than all other countries.
The ratio of the primary-earner tax rate to the secondary-earner tax rate is interesting
because it can be compared to optimal tax rules expressing relative tax rates as a function of
elasticities (e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski, 1983; Kleven and Kreiner, 2006). In the special case
of separability in utility of spousal labor supplies, the optimal tax rate on each spouse is given
by an inverse elasticity rule and the optimal relative tax rate τp/τ s is therefore given by the
participation elasticity of the secondary earner relative to the primary earner. This implies that
the tax ratios in the table can be seen as critical values for relative participation elasticities.
For example, in the United Kingdom, if the second-earner elasticity is more than 2.79 times as
high as the primary earner elasticity, it would be eﬃcient to shift some of the tax burden from
7Our tax-rate estimates are therefore calculated for those currently working. As a result of sample selection,
one would expect tax rates to be diﬀerent for non-working individuals considering a transition into work. As we
do not observe the earnings potential of non-working individuals, calculating their participation tax rates would
require jointly estimating a wage and participation model for couples. In the microsimulation exercise in Section
4, we deal with the selection issue indirectly by considering a decreasing profile of participation elasticities such
that new labor market entrants tend to be located at the bottom end of the income distribution.
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secondary earners to primary earners. In view of the evidence on the responsiveness of labor
force participation of married women, the table seems to suggest that in many countries the
relative tax rate on secondary earners is ineﬃciently high. We return to this issue in Section 4.
Finally, the table shows that both participation and earnings (conditional on participation)
tend to be strongly skewed in favor of primary earners in most countries. Although the countries
we consider diﬀer along many dimensions (besides tax rates) that may have direct implications
for labor market outcomes, it is interesting that the cross-country variation in relative partic-
ipation is roughly consistent with the variation in relative participation taxes. For example,
Southern European countries are characterized by lower participation taxes along with higher
participation rates for primary relative to secondary earners compared to most other countries.
At the other end of the spectrum, Denmark, Finland, and the UK are associated with higher
relative tax rates and lower relative participation for primary earners.
Let us now consider the jointness of the couple tax function T (zp, zs) and therefore the
cross-derivative T 00ps. One benchmark case is that of fully individual taxation, i.e. T (zp, zs) =
Tp (zp) + Ts (zs), which is associated with a zero cross-derivative T 00ps = 0. In practice, the
functional forms Tp (.) and Ts (.) would typically be the same, in which case we have a so-called
anonymous individual tax. Another benchmark case is the fully joint couple tax T (zp + zs) as
adopted in the United States and in some European countries (see Table A1). If the system
additionally features a progressive marginal tax rate structure (T 00 > 0), the couple tax would
be associated with a positive cross-derivative T 00ps > 0. More generally, there is a whole range
of joint couple tax functions T (zp, zs) with T 00ps 6= 0. Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2007) define
positive jointness as a system where the tax on one person depends positively on spousal earnings
(T 00ps > 0), and negative jointness as a system where the tax on each partner depends negatively
on spousal earnings (T 00ps < 0). Because a fully joint schedule is associated with positive jointness,
individual taxation can be seen as an intermediate (rather than polar) case in between full
jointness and negative jointness. This is interesting because we show below that many real-
world schedules feature negative jointness, implying that they have moved further away from
fully joint taxation than the individual system.
The above definitions of jointness are stated in terms of cross-derivatives of marginal tax
rates. Consistent with the analysis of tax rate levels, we will state a definition of jointness in
terms of participation tax rates. In particular, we say that a system is positively joint if ∂τs∂zp > 0,
negatively joint if ∂τs∂zp < 0, and separate if
∂τs
∂zp = 0. While the definitions of jointness in terms of
marginal tax rates are local, the definitions in terms of participation (‘average’) tax rates reflect
that a tax schedule is joint on average over a range of incomes.
Before turning to the empirical results, it is helpful for a moment to separate the tax and
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transfer system. Denote by t (zp, zs) the tax payment and by b (zp, zs) the benefit payment,
so that T (zp, zs) = t (zp, zs) − b (zp, zs). Consider then a tax-transfer scheme that combines
an individual income tax and a fully joint transfer system, i.e. T (zp, zs) = tp (zp) + ts (zs) −
b (zp + zs). The definition in eq. (1) then implies τ s = [ts (zs) + b (zp)− b (zp + zs)] /zs. Means-
testing corresponds to b (zp) − b (zp + zs) ≥ 0, which creates an extra tax on second-earner
participation. However, as zp increases, the family is pushed beyond the phase-out range of the
various transfer programs (at any given zs), which tends to lower b (zp)− b (zp + zs) and create
a pattern where ∂τs∂zp < 0 at the bottom. This explains a pattern we find for many countries.
For our measurement of jointness, we construct a number of hypothetical households that
vary with respect to household earnings and the number of children, and apply EUROMOD to
calculate eﬀective tax rates for these hypothetical families.8 We base this part of the analysis on
hypothetical households (instead of data on actual households) in order to adequately isolate the
interdependence between spouses in the tax-benefit legislation. If we were to use sample data
and compare the net-tax burden of actual households at diﬀerent earnings levels, the results
would be aﬀected by selection eﬀects.9
To illustrate the jointness in the tax-transfer system, we plot the participation tax rate of
married individuals at diﬀerent income levels as a function of the earnings of the spouse.10
We consider married individuals at four diﬀerent income levels: the 5th, 10th, 50th, and 90th
percentiles of the earnings distribution of secondary earners (denoted below by SEp5, SEp10,
SEp50, and SEp90). For each of these individual income levels, we calculate the participation tax
rate at 20 diﬀerent earnings levels of the spouse, corresponding to the 5th, 10th, 15th,..., 100th
percentiles in the earnings distribution of primary earners (denoted below by PEp5, PEp10,
..., PEp100). Our results are shown in Figure 1 for families with two children. Corresponding
graphs for childless couples are provided in Figure A2 the appendix.11
The most striking result is that most countries display substantial negative jointness at the
bottom of the income distribution. As explained above, this can be largely attributed to means-
tested benefits such as social assistance, housing benefits and child benefits that are phased-out
8Because we are working with hypothetical households, it is necessary to make an assumption about the living
arrangements of the families. We have chosen to assume that all families reside in rental housing, and have then
imputed rental costs for all countries.
9For instance, marriage patterns are known to display positive assortative matching, which in itself would tend
to produce a positive relationship between individual tax rates and spousal earnings.
10For completeness, Figure A1 in the appendix illustrates jointness based on marginal tax rates. The qualitative
results are similar to those presented below, but participation tax rate measures are smoother because they reflect
average jointness of marginal tax rates over a range of incomes.
11When considering a couple with one spouse belonging to the bottom of the earnings distribution for primary
earners and the other spouse located at the top of the earnings distribution for secondary earners, it may actually
be the second spouse who has the highest earnings. This is, however, only relevant for the lower part of the
two grey curves because the earnings of the secondary earners in the data are substantially lower than primary
earnings. Moreover, the slopes of the curves still reveal the type of jointness at these earnings combinations.
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as a function of total household income.12 Indeed, the high claw-back rates used in many
countries tend to generate participation taxes that are very high for secondary earners married
to low-wage primary earners, often above 70% and sometimes close to 100%.
Countries with negative jointness at low income levels may be divided into two groups de-
pending on the pattern at higher income levels. Countries that operate an individual income tax
(possibly apart from some family-based tax expenditures at the bottom) and/or have a fairly
flat tax rate structure at the top tend to converge towards no jointness as the income of the
primary earner becomes high.13 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom
display this pattern, which we may label negative-neutral jointness. The strongest example of
this pattern is perhaps the United Kingdom where negative jointness at the bottom is driven by
both the welfare and the tax system. The Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), an in-work
cash benefit provided through the tax system, is based on household income and is phased out
at a rate of 70%. The combination of the WFTC and the withdrawal of social assistance and
housing benefits creates participation tax rates at around 70-90% for secondary earners married
to low-income spouses. While second-earner participation in the UK is therefore strongly dis-
couraged in low-income families, it is encouraged in higher-income families due to the individual
income tax. In particular, because working spouses with low earnings are not liable to pay either
income tax and social insurance contributions, the second-earner tax rate at SEp5 and SEp10
drops to zero once primary-earner income exceeds PEp30 and stays at zero as primary earnings
increase.
Another group of countries combine negative jointness at the bottom with positive jointness
at the top. Countries with this pattern of negative-positive jointness are Belgium, France,
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal. All of these countries operate a progressive tax
system based on family income causing the secondary-earner participation tax to be increasing
in primary-earner income once the family is beyond the phase-out range of welfare programs.
However, the degree of positive jointness at the top is generally quite weak and much less salient
than the negative jointness at the bottom. This may seem surprising but can be explained by
the fact that the marginal tax rate structure is quite flat in most European countries, partly as a
result of upper contribution limits built into social security contribution schedules. As explained
12 In Germany and Belgium, there is an initial slight increase in the second-earner tax rate at low levels of
primary-earner income provided that the secondary earner also enters at a low earnings level. This is because
these countries employ an earnings disregard in the transfer system, so that the lowest-income families are not
aﬀected by benefit withdrawal.
13Notice that a flat (linear) income tax, even if it is based on family income, eﬀectively implies separability
in the tax treatment of spouses. As an example, this is important for Denmark, which operates a form of joint
taxation by combining individual filing with the possibility of transferring certain allowances and exemptions
across spouses. However, because the marginal tax rate structure is quite flat there is very little jointness at the
top.
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above, a completely linear tax system, even if it is based on family income, eﬀectively implies
separability in the tax treatment of spouses. Notice also that, in France, the curve is relatively
flat both at the bottom and at the top because the withdrawal of various family benefits and
housing assistance occurs at diﬀerent income levels and tends to oﬀset the presence of positive
jointness in the income tax.14
Greece, Italy, and to some extent the Netherlands are the only countries that show virtu-
ally no jointness. All three countries operate individual income tax systems, and in Greece
and Italy only very limited means-tested benefits are available.15 The Netherlands does oﬀer
family-based social assistance, but primary earnings are higher in the Netherlands than in most
other countries, implying that transfer phase-out plays a limited role for second-earner labor
market entry.16 Spain is the only country characterized by positive jointness. There is no social
assistance and the design of the Spanish income tax implies that, for low-income families, it is
optimal to file under the optional joint tax. For higher-income families, it is typically optimal to
file separately, which explains why there is less jointness if the secondary earner is at the median
or above.
4 AWelfare Evaluation of Cutting Taxes for Secondary Earners
It is often argued that the tax burden on secondary earners should be reduced in order to
increase economic eﬃciency. Indeed, a traditional Ramsey-type eﬃciency argument calls for
a low marginal tax rate on secondary earners because their labor supply is relatively elastic
(Rosen, 1977; Boskin and Sheshinski, 1983). The traditional argument is derived in a model
with only hours-of-work responses and where the tax system is restricted to be linear (albeit
gender specific). However, the modern empirical labor supply literature shows that the strong
responsiveness of the labor supply of married females is driven by labor force participation, not
by hours worked for those who are working (e.g., Heckman, 1993; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).
This calls for a policy that reduces the participation tax rate on secondary earners.
A policy change should be evaluated, not just in terms of eﬃciency, but also with respect to
its consequences for distributional equity. A revenue-neutral reform reducing the participation
14 In France, the drop in the participation tax rate for low-wage secondary earners (at SEp10) when the primary-
earner income becomes very high (at PEp95) is due to complicated features of the income test for family benefits
(Allocations Familiales) that were in place only in 1998, the year of our sample.
15 In Greece, no means-tested benefits are available for married couples. In Italy, such benefits are very limited,
especially for couples without kids as reflected by the almost completely flat curve (in appendix) for those couples.
Further, family benefits in Italy are phased-out in discrete amounts at diﬀerent income levels, which accounts for
the small bumps visible for low-income families.
16The small bump around PEp40 reflects mandatory health insurance contributions for non-working spouses
that apply to primary earners with earnings below a certain threshold. Above this earnings level, health insurance
constributions for non-working spouses are voluntary and hence not counted as taxes.
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tax rate on secondary earners necessarily implies a redistribution in favor of two-earner couples
at the expense of one-earner and/or zero-earner couples. To the extent that two-earner couples
are better oﬀ than zero- and one-earner couples such reforms come at the cost of a reduction
in distributional equity. While the statement that two-earner couples are better oﬀ than zero-
earner couples seems noncontroversial, the comparison between one- and two-earner couples is
more subtle. Notice first that, for a given level of primary earnings, the notion that two-earner
couples are better oﬀ than one-earner couples is consistent with the underlying assumption
in all of the optimal income tax literature that higher household income is a signal of higher
utility.17 Whether two-earner couples are better oﬀ on average depends also on the sorting in the
marriage market. Positive sorting in earnings (such that two-earner couples tend to have higher
primary-earner income along with the presence of secondary-earner income) reinforces the view
that two-earner couples are better oﬀ. On the other hand, if there is negative sorting whereby
rich people tend to have non-working spouses, it is theoretically possible that one-earner couples
are better oﬀ on average. However, as shown by Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2008) for the UK,
there is a positive correlation in spousal earnings (conditional on working) combined with a
very weak correlation between primary-earner income and spousal labor force participation. All
this suggests that two-earner couples are better oﬀ, so that lowering the participation tax on
secondary earners comes at a cost of distributional equity.
In this section, we start by setting out a simple extensive labor supply model allowing us
to evaluate the eﬃciency-equity trade-oﬀ for reforms aimed at increasing second-earner partic-
ipation. In particular, we consider small (marginal) tax reforms, which provide a transfer to
two-earner couples financed by either a tax on both zero- and one-earner couples or a tax on
one-earner couples only. The taxes and transfers implemented by the reforms are lump sum con-
ditional on family participation status and therefore do not aﬀect marginal tax rates. Reforms
of this type could be implemented in practice by changing the structure of family allowances.
At the end of the section, we generalize the labor supply model to incorporate both intensive
and extensive responses for both spouses, and consider reforms that reduce the tax burden on
secondary earners by changing marginal tax rates.
4.1 A Simple Joint Labor Supply Model
We consider couples where each spouse decides whether or not to work, but where hours worked
conditional on working are fixed. Labor force participation varies across couples due to hetero-
geneity in earnings potential and work costs, and households can be grouped into three diﬀerent
17 In the presence of general non-linear tax instruments, the relevant comparison for the determination of the
optimal tax on secondary entry is indeed between diﬀerent types of couples at a given level of primary earnings
(Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2007).
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categories: no-earner, one-earner, and two-earner couples. In each household, we identify a pri-
mary earner and a secondary earner where, by definition, the primary earner enters the labor
market first and has higher earnings conditional on working. Each spouse is characterized by
a fixed earnings potential, which we denote by
¡
zhp , zhs
¢
for the two spouses in a household of
type h. Letting zi (i = p, s) denote the actual earnings choice, the participation choice for each
spouse then amounts to choosing between zi = 0 and zi = zhi . The number of households of type
h is denoted Nh, h = 1, ...,H, and the total population of households equals N ≡
PH
h=1Nh.
All households share a common quasi-linear utility function given by
u (c, zp, zs) = c− qp · 1 (zp > 0)− qs · 1 (zs > 0) , (2)
where c is household consumption, and qp, qs denote work costs for the primary and secondary
earner, respectively. The work costs capture all costs associated with labor market entry such as a
distaste for participation, the value of lost home production, costs of child care and commuting,
etc. The indicator function 1 (.) takes on the value 1 when a given spouse works (zi > 0,
i = p, s) and zero otherwise. The above utility specification rules out income eﬀects which
simplifies considerably the theoretical analysis (Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2007, 2008) as well
as the welfare aggregation.
The household faces a non-linear income tax schedule T (zp, zs, θ), where θ is a shift parameter
that we use below to capture the eﬀects of a tax reform. The tax function constitutes a net
payment to the public sector, embodying both taxes and transfers. The consumption of each
household equals their total net-of-tax earnings, such that eq. (2) can be written as
u = zp + zs − T (zp, zs, θ)− qp · 1 (zp > 0)− qs · 1 (zs > 0) . (3)
Households choose earnings zp and zs so as to maximize eq. (3). For households of type h
(i.e., earnings pair zhp , zhs ), there is a distribution of fixed costs described by a continuous joint
density function fh (qp, qs) defined over [0,∞) × [0,∞). We define the unconditional density
and distribution functions of qp as fh (qp) and Fh (qp), and the conditional density and distrib-
ution functions of qs as ph (qs |qp ) and P (qs |qp ), and hence the joint density can be written as
fh (qp, qs) = ph (qs |qp ) · fh (qp).
Consistent with much empirical work in this area, we consider households making a sequential
labor force participation decision. First, it is decided whether or not the primary earner should
enter the labor market and then, conditional on primary-earner participation, it is decided if
the secondary earner should join the labor force as well. We need to ensure that the assumed
entry sequence is consistent with household optimization, which amounts to a restriction on
the joint distribution of fixed work costs. Figure 2 illustrates the problem by depicting the
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possible joint labor supply choices of the two spouses. The crucial assumption we make is that,
both before and after a tax reform, couples are observed only in the shaded areas (0, 1 and
2). The part of the assumption that concerns the initial (before-reform) distribution of couples
is innocuous, because we simply define the primary earner (i.e., the highest-earning spouse) in
such a way that it is consistent with the permissible pattern. However, when we consider tax
reforms that induce families to change participation status, we must make sure that no families
move to region ∅ in the figure. This problem is reminiscent of the double-deviation problem
in optimal multi-dimensional pricing theory (e.g. Armstrong and Rochet, 1999) and in the
theory of optimal taxation with more than one dimension of unobserved household characteristics
(e.g., Mirrlees, 1976, 1986; Kleven et al., 2007). While the double-deviation problem poses
considerable complexity for studies that attempt to solve for the optimal incentive scheme in a
multi-dimensional screening context, it is easier to deal with the issue here because we consider
only small pertubations (marginal reforms) around an initial equilibrium. Appendix A shows
how we deal with the double-deviation issue by imposing restrictions on the distribution of fixed
costs.
Given the assumed sequence of labor market entries, a primary earner decides to enter if the
net household utility gain of doing so, conditional on spousal non-participation, is positive. For
household h, this implies
qp ≤ zhp −
h
T
³
zhp , 0, θ
´
− T (0, 0, θ)
i
≡ q¯hp , (4)
where q¯hp is the net-of-tax income gain of primary-earner entry for household type h. Primary
earners with qp ≤ q¯hp decide to enter the labor market at zp = zhp , whereas primary earners with
qp > q¯hp stay outside the labor force. Conditional on primary-earner entry, the secondary earner
in household h enters if
qs ≤ zhs −
h
T
³
zhp , z
h
s , θ
´
− T
³
zhp , 0, θ
´i
≡ q¯hs , (5)
where q¯hs is the net-of-tax income gain of second-earner entry.
Let Eh0 = Nh
£
1− Fh
¡
q¯hp
¢¤
, Eh1 = NhFh
¡
q¯hp
¢
− Eh2 and Eh2 = Nh
R q¯hp
0 Ph
¡
q¯hs |qp
¢
fh (qp) dqp
denote, respectively, the number of zero-earner, one-earner, and two-earner couples of type
h. Consistent with our assumed sequence of labor market entry, we define the participation
elasticities for primary and secondary earners as
ηhp ≡
∂Eh1
∂
£
zhp
¡
1− ahp
¢¤ zhp ¡1− ahp¢
Eh1
, ηhs ≡
∂Eh2
∂ [zhs (1− ahs )]
zhs
¡
1− ahs
¢
Eh2
,
where ahp ≡
£
T
¡
zhp , 0, θ
¢
− T (0, 0, θ)
¤
/zhp is the participation tax rate for primary earners in
household type h, and ahs ≡
£
T
¡
zhp , zhs , θ
¢
− T
¡
zhp , 0, θ
¢¤
/zhs is the participation tax rate for
secondary earners.
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Because no households are observed with only the secondary earner working, government
revenue can be written as
R =
X
h
h
T
³
zhp , z
h
s , θ
´
Eh2 + T
³
zhp , 0, θ
´
Eh1 + T (0, 0, θ)E
h
0
i
,
which is simply the sum of the tax proceeds (net of transfers) from two-earner families (first
term), one-earner families (second term), and zero-earner families (third term).
4.2 A Microsimulation Study of Reform
This section studies the eﬀects of small tax reforms, dθ, that reduce the tax burden on second-
earner participation, ∂ahs/∂θ < 0, and are revenue-neutral, dR/dθ = 0. As explained above,
such reforms necessarily imply a redistribution in favor of two-earner couples at the expense
of one- and zero-earner couples, and are therefore associated with a trade-oﬀ between equity
and eﬃciency. We derive theoretical measures of the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀs associated with
two specific reforms as a function of behavioral elasticities and parameters of the tax-transfer
system, and apply the analytical results to our samples of married couple populations in 15 EU
countries using EUROMOD.
Following Browning and Johnson (1984) and Immervoll et al. (2007), we divide the popu-
lation into those who gain from the reform and those who lose from the reform. We denote by
dG ≥ 0 the aggregate welfare gain of those who gain from the reform and by dL ≤ 0 the aggre-
gate welfare change of those who loose from the reform. Notice that a Pareto improving reform
(no losers) implies dL = 0, whereas a Pareto worsening reform (no gainers) implies dG = 0.
Due to the eﬃciency eﬀects of changing distortionary taxes and transfers, the decline in
welfare for those who lose from the reform (i.e., zero- and one-earner couples) is generally
diﬀerent from the gain in welfare for those who gain from the reform (i.e., two-earner couples).
In particular, because we consider reforms designed to increase eﬃciency by subsidizing second-
earner participation, we would expect that the gain for two-earner couples is higher than the loss
for zero- and one-earner couples. At the same time, because two-earner couples tend to be better
oﬀ than the rest of the population, policy makers may put a lower social welfare weight on the
gain for two-earner couples. A critical question then becomes how to evaluate the desirability
of reforms involving such inter-household utility trade-oﬀs. The standard approach has been
to postulate a social welfare function associated with certain welfare weights across diﬀerent
households, but the problem is that the inter-household comparisons implied by the adopted
social welfare function are subjective and this limits the applicability of such an analysis as an
input into the policy-making process. Following Immervoll et al. (2007), we therefore adopt a
diﬀerent approach, which consists in estimating critical values for the social welfare weights that
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would make a reform break even in terms of social welfare.
To make this precise, we define the inter-household utility trade-oﬀ Ψ in the following way:
Ψ = − dL
dG
.
The resulting number may be interpreted as the Euro-value of the welfare loss for those who lose
from the reform (zero- and one-earner couples) per additional Euro transferred to those who gain
(two-earner couples). If the reform succeeds in increasing eﬃciency (dL+ dG > 0), the value of
Ψ is below 1, implying that it costs less than one Euro for zero-earner and one-earner couples
to transfer an additional Euro to two-earner couples. However, to the extent that the social
marginal welfare weight on two-earner couples relative to other couples is below one, Ψ < 1 does
not necessarily make the reform desirable. Generally, the lower is Ψ, the more desirable is the
reform, and if Ψ = 0 the reform represents a Pareto-improvement.
The first reform (Reform A) reduces tax rates on secondary earners by uniformly lowering
the tax burden on two-earner couples financed by uniformly increasing the tax burden on zero-
and one-earner couples. The size of the extra tax on zero- and one-earner couples is determined
endogenously to balance the government budget taking into account the revenue implications
of behavioral responses. The reform increases second-earner participation, but has no eﬀect
on primary-earner incentives to enter the labor market as the tax increase is uniform across
households with one earner and no earners. The trade-oﬀ measure for Reform A may be derived
as (see Appendix A)
ΨA =
1−
P
h e
h
2
ahs
1−ahs
ηhs
1 + e21−e2
P
h e
h
2
ahs
1−ahs
ηhs
< 1, (6)
where e2 is the share of two-earner couples in the total population of couples, and eh2 is the
share of two-earner couples that are of type h. This type of reform is always associated with an
inter-household trade-oﬀ Ψ below 1: the increase in second-earner participation (at unchanged
primary-earner participation) raises revenue, implying that the government can finance a welfare
increase of one Euro to two-earner couples by imposing a welfare cost of less than one Euro on all
other couples. It is clear from eq. (6) that the key determinants of the inter-household trade-oﬀ
are the participation tax rates and participation elasticities of secondary earners, and that Ψ is
decreasing in ahs and ηhs as one would expect.
The second reform (Reform B) finances the tax cut on two-earner couples by taxing only one-
earner couples, thereby avoiding a reduction in the welfare of zero-earner families. While reform
B is associated with a better distributional profile than Reform A, the eﬃciency eﬀects may be
less desirable for Reform B because it increases participation tax rates on primary earners. The
16
trade-oﬀ measure for Reform B can be expressed as (see Appendix A)
ΨB =
1−
P
h e
h
2
ahs
1−ahs
ηhs
1−
P
h e
h
1
ahp
1−ahp
ηhp +
e2
e1
P
h e
h
2
ahs
1−ahs
ηhs
, (7)
where e1 is the share of one-earner households in the population, and eh1 is the share of one-
earner households that are of type h. As for the first reform, the trade-oﬀ associated with
Reform B is decreasing in second-earner participation tax rates and participation elasticities.
The trade-oﬀ ΨB additionally depends on primary-earner parameters: higher participation tax
rates and higher participation elasticities for primary earners increase the trade-oﬀ. This reflects
the negative eﬃciency eﬀect associated with some one-earner couples dropping back to the zero-
earner schedule as the tax on one-earner couples increases. Although the negative participation
responses of primary earners tend to worsen the trade-oﬀ of reform B compared to reform A,
there is an oﬀsetting eﬀect that tends to make the reform more desirable. The impact on
the second-earner participation incentive is larger for reform B, because it finances the tax
cuts for two-earner families entirely by higher taxes on one-earner families and therefore has
a larger eﬀect on the utility diﬀerence between two-earner and one-earner couples. Thus, it is
theoretically possible that reform B improves eﬃciency by more than reform A, and this is more
likely to occur if the share of one-earner households e1 is low, in which case reform B leads to a
large tax increase for one-earner households.
We now turn to numerical simulations based on EUROMOD. As described, we identify the
primary earner as the highest-earning member of the couple, and construct pre-tax earnings
distributions for primary and secondary earners. Because the theoretical analysis is based on a
discrete formulation dividing the population of couples intoH earnings-groups, we have to define
these subgroups in the empirical application. We divide the sample based on earnings quintiles
(conditional on working) for primary and secondary earners, which yields 30 household groups
(5× 5 two-earner families and 5 one-earner families). For each household group, we calculate a
participation tax rate using the approach described in Section 3.
We calibrate participation elasticities based on the empirical labor supply literature. There
is an extensive literature on the labor force participation of married couples based on data from
the United States and European countries. This literature has been surveyed by, among others,
Blundell (1995) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). The literature finds that participation
elasticities for married women (secondary earners) are substantial across a wide set of countries
with values ranging from 0.5 to 1, whereas participation elasticities for prime-age males (primary
earners) tend to be very small. Moreover, there is evidence that participation elasticities tend to
be larger at the bottom of the earnings distribution than at the top of the earnings distribution,
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although some studies have found that elasticities for married women may still be substantial
at the top (e.g. Eissa, 1995).
Results of the simulations are presented in Table 3. We consider four diﬀerent elasticity
scenarios. The first three scenarios assume that the participation elasticities are constant across
earnings groups, whereas the last scenario assumes that elasticities are higher at the bottom.
Average elasticities for primary and secondary earners are shown in the table for each scenario.
We start by focusing on Reform A. Recall that the inter-household trade-oﬀ associated with
this reform (eq. 6) does not depend on the participation elasticity for primary earners, only the
elasticity for secondary earners matters. The first scenario assumes a participation elasticity of
0.5 for secondary earners. In this scenario, many countries show a quite favorable trade-oﬀ. In
Germany, one- and zero-earner couples incur a loss of just 0.14 Euros for an additional Euro
distributed to two-earner couples. In Belgium, Denmark, and France, second-earner tax rates
are so high that a tax cut to two-earner families creates Laﬀer eﬀects and therefore a Pareto
improvement. In general, the favorable trade-oﬀs for this reform and elasticity scenario reflect
the high participation tax rates on secondary earners (compared to elasticities) that we saw in
Table 2. In accordance with the pattern in Table 2, Reform A is less attractive in Greece, the
UK, and Spain than in Northern-Continental European countries and Scandinavia.
Not surprisingly, Reform A becomes better (worse) as the participation elasticity of secondary
earners increases (declines). In the second scenario where the second-earner elasticity is set
equal to 0.7, the reform is costless or nearly costless to zero- and one-earner couples in half of
the countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, and Sweden). On the
other hand, in the third scenario where the second-earner elasticity is set equal to 0.3, it is only
Belgium that has no losers from the reform. Nevertheless, even in this scenario, nine countries
have trade-oﬀs at or below 1/2. Scenario 4 assumes the same average elasticity as in the first
scenario but with a declining profile as a function of earnings.18 The results do not change
much compared to scenario 1, although there is a general tendency for the trade-oﬀ measure
to increase. The reason is that the positive feedback eﬀect on government revenue from higher
participation is lower when the additional participation is generated at lower earnings levels
where second-earner participation tax rates are typically lower.
The consequences of Reform B depend also on the primary-earner participation elasticity. In
scenario 1, where the primary-earner elasticity is set equal to 0.1, we see that Ψ increases com-
pared to Reform A but that the diﬀerences between the two reforms are small for all countries.
18The primary-earner elasticity is set equal to 0.3 at the lowest quintile of the primary earner income distribution
(PEq1), 0.1 for PEq2 and PEq3, and 0 for PEq4 and PEq5. For secondary earners, the elasticity equals 0.8 for
the lowest quintile of the secondary earner income distribution (SEq1), 0.6 for SEq2, 0.2 for SEq3, and 0 for SEq4
and SEq5.
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Hence, the two counteracting eﬀects on economic eﬃciency discussed above more or less cancel
out in this elasticity scenario. When we look across the diﬀerent scenarios, the eﬀects of Reform
A and B are roughly comparable except for Scenario 3 where we assume equal responsiveness
for primary and secondary earners. This scenario is not realistic but highlights the importance
of the relative participation elasticities when evaluating reforms of type B that aﬀect zero- and
one-earner couples diﬀerently. In this scenario, ten countries would experience lower eﬃciency
by implementing reform B (i.e., Ψ > 1), and in seven of those countries nobody gains from
the reform (Pareto worsening). The explanation is that, for most countries, primary earners
face higher participation tax rates than secondary earners. This implies that, with identical
elasticities, that primary-earner labor supply is more distorted than second-earner labor sup-
ply, and it is therefore suboptimal to induce additional second-earner entry at the expense of
primary-earner exit.
4.3 Evaluating Reforms that Aﬀect the Intensive Margin of Labor Supply
The reforms considered so far shift the tax burden across couples without changing marginal
tax rates. Such reforms do not aﬀect the intensive margin of labor supply (in the absence
of income eﬀects), and the assumption of fixed hours of work is therefore innocuous in the
context of those reforms. But to analyze reforms associated with changes in marginal tax rates,
it is necessary to extend the model to allow for both intensive and extensive responses for
both spouses. Appendix B extends the model in this way, and derives the eﬀects of a reform
(Reform C) that uniformly reduces the marginal tax rate on secondary earners financed by
uniformly increasing the marginal tax rate on primary earners in one-earner couples. Zero-
earner couples are left unaﬀected. Like Reform B considered above, the reform considered here
shifts participation taxes from secondary earners to primary earners, but the profile of the tax
changes is diﬀerent. Compared to the previous reform, changes in participation taxes are now
higher at the top and lower at the bottom.
Table 4 presents the inter-household utility trade-oﬀ implied by reform C for three diﬀerent
elasticity scenarios. In all three scenarios, the participation elasticities are set at our preferred
levels of 0.1 for primary earners and 0.5 for secondary earners. To establish a benchmark, the
first scenario assumes that hours-of-work elasticities are equal to zero for both spouses. In
this case, Reform C is associated with slightly more favorable trade-oﬀs than Reform B. The
reason is that the participation tax rates of secondary earners often have an increasing profile
(due to the progressivity of the tax system), whereas the participation tax rates of primary
earners often display a decreasing profile (due to the impact of means-tested transfers on the
first entrant). This implies that reform C (relative to Reform B) concentrates the tax cuts
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to secondary earners on those with the highest participation tax rates, while it concentrates
the tax increases for primary earners on those with the lowest participation tax rates. The
second scenario sets the intensive elasticity to 0.1 for both primary and secondary earners. This
generates an additional eﬃciency gain on the intensive margin for secondary earners, but also an
eﬃciency loss from the intensive responses of primary earners. The total eﬀect is that trade-oﬀs
are slightly more favorable. Scenario 3 features the same overall responsiveness on the intensive
margin as Scenario 2 (the sum of the two elasticities is unchanged), but the response is now
concentrated entirely on secondary earners. This makes reform C even more attractive and five
countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and Sweden) can implement the reform at no
distributional cost.
Our conclusion is that the incorporation of hours-of-work responses into the analysis (assum-
ing realistic elasticities) does not change the qualitative insights oﬀered above and has a fairly
small quantitative impact. If anything, the conclusions regarding the welfare eﬀects of cutting
taxes for secondary earners are reinforced by this generalization.
5 Marriage Penalties in Europe
We now turn our attention to the tax-transfer implications of marriage. We present estimates
of the marriage penalty defined as the increase in the combined tax liability net of transfers of
two individuals following marriage.19 The marriage penalty has attracted significant interest
historically, especially in the United States where tax acts aﬀecting married couples have often
been motivated by an attempt to ‘fix’ the problem of marriage penalties. The concern about
marriage penalties has been motivated by notions of fairness in the tax treatment of families
(horizontal equity across married and cohabitating couples), and by the possibility that tax and
transfer incentives distort the decision to marry. A number of papers have studied the eﬀects
on marriage and divorce from income taxes (e.g., Alm and Whittington, 1995a,b, 1997, 1999),
welfare benefits (e.g., Hoynes, 1997a,b; Moﬃtt, 1998; Bitler et al., 2004), or taxes and benefits
combined (Dickert-Conlin, 1999; Eissa and Hoynes, 2000b). Although these studies tend to
find either modest or no eﬀects, the implications of marriage disincentives continue to be a
controversial point of contention and marriage-dependent taxes and transfers are frequently
accused by conservatives of destroying the traditional two-parent family and creating higher
rates of single motherhood.
Almost all existing studies of marriage penalties focus on the United States and account
19While we use the term marriage penalty throughout the paper, it would perhaps be more precise to use the
label formal cohabitation penalty. In principle, income transfers are based on family income regardless of marital
status, although in practice it is diﬃcult for the authorities to verify cohabitation when there is no marriage
certificate.
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only for the implications of the tax system (e.g., Rosen, 1987; Feenberg and Rosen, 1995; Alm
and Whittington, 1996; Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 1998; Bull et al., 1999; Alm et al., 1999;
Eissa and Hoynes, 2000a). An exception to this strong US-orientation in the literature is the
comparative study of marriage taxes by Pechman and Engelhardt (1990) who considered a subset
of the European countries in our sample. While Pechman and Engelhardt considered only the
tax system, we have seen in this paper that most of the jointness in redistribution schemes
in Europe is driven by the welfare system suggesting that there may be important transfer-
consequences to marriage. EUROMOD allows us to undertake a comparative study of marriage
penalties across a large set of countries, and to incorporate fully the implication of both the tax
and the transfer system.
It is helpful to start by considering some general properties of marriage penalties. Denoting
by T i (.) the tax function (net of transfers) that applies to individual filers and by T c (.) the tax
function applying to couples, the marriage penalty is defined as
MP ≡ T c (zp, zs)−
£
T i (zp) + T i (zs)
¤
. (8)
Individual income tax treatment of couples, i.e. T c (zp, zs) = T i (zp)+T i (zs), is the only income
tax system that does not introduce a distortion of the marriage decision, MP = 0. On the other
hand, jointness generally implies MP 6= 0, and the sign of MP depends on the design of the
joint schedule and on the pair of incomes zp, zs in a given family. If MP is negative, we say
that there is a marriage subsidy. An example of a tax system giving rise to marriage subsidies
(ignoring the welfare system) is a progressive and fully joint tax scheme with income splitting,
so that each spouse is liable to pay taxes on half the couple’s combined earnings. Formally,
this is a system where T c (zp, zs) = T i
³
zp+zs
2
´
+ T i
³
zp+zs
2
´
≡ T c (zp + zs). Income splitting
subsidizes marriage by allowing a couple to avoid part of the progressivity of the tax system.
Family-based and means-tested transfers generally give rise to marriage penalties. As in
Section 3, let us separate the T -functions into taxes (tc (.) , ti (.)) and benefits (bc (.) , bi (.)). The
combination of individual taxation and family-based transfers then implies MP ≡ bi (zp) +
bi (zs)− bc (zp + zs). Then, if the bi (.) and bc (.) functions are the same (so that marital status
is not an eligibility criterion in its own right), we have MP > 0 because b0 (.) < 0 as a result of
means-testing. Moreover, if there is additional targeting to single parents (in which case bc (z) <
bi (z) given the presence of children), the marriage penalty is even higher. Because family-based,
means-tested transfers as well as targeting to single motherhood tend to be very important at
the bottom of the distribution, we would expect to find significant marriage penalties at the
bottom. Moreover, these features would be particularly important in countries where welfare
systems are relatively generous (such as the Nordic countries).
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The marriage penalty in eq. (8) is calculated using EUROMOD by measuring the change in
the combined tax liability net of transfers of a couple following a separation, holding individual
earnings constant.20 We consider households at ten diﬀerent earnings configurations, ranging
from both spouses being out of work to both spouses earning at the top decile in their respective
earnings distributions, and we consider families with either two children or no children. When
children are involved, we assume that each spouse takes custody of one child after the divorce.21
We also assume that, following the divorce, each spouse faces half the rental cost of the couple
when they were married.22 The marriage penalties are shown in Table 5 for the case of two
children. Table A4 in the appendix shows the results for families without children. Marriage
penalties are reported on an annual basis and in 2007 Euros.
The results reveal substantial marriage penalties in most countries, and the penalties depend
primarily on the income of the lowest-earning spouse. Indeed, marriage penalties are often very
high even when the primary earner is at the top decile as long as second-earner income is low.
Moreover, marriage penalties are almost everywhere considerably higher when the couple has
children, often more than twice as high. These patterns point to the benefit system as an
important determinant of marriage penalties. In fact, in all countries, the strong targeting of
transfer programs to single parents is the single most important factor contributing to marriage
penalties. The tax system per se is not very important. As a result, the highest marriage
penalties are found in countries that have the most generous benefit programs such as the
Nordic countries, the Netherlands, France and Germany. Because of highly targeted transfers
to single parents, the United Kingdom and Ireland also show substantial marriage penalties for
families with children, although their social assistance programs are on the whole less generous
than those of the Nordic countries.
There are some exceptions to this general pattern of high marriage penalties. Italy oﬀers
non-trivial marriage subsidies resulting from family benefits available only to married couples
with children. The tax-transfer system in Greece is virtually neutral with respect to marriage
for couples without children, but does feature minor penalties for couples with children. This
20Although individual earnings may of course change following a separation, it is conceptually important to
keep earnings constant in order to obtain the correct tax price on marriage. Notice that, if earnings were allowed
to change at separation, even a fully individual-based redistribution scheme would appear to feature marriage
penalties or subsidies.
21The assumption of a 1-1 split of custody is diﬀerent from the usual assumptions in the (US-based) literature
on marriage taxes. This literature typically assumes that either (i) the children reside with the mother (Dickert-
Conlin and Houser, 1998; Eissa and Hoynes, 2000a) or (ii) custody is determined by a tax minimization strategy
(Rosen, 1987; Feenberg and Rosen, 1995). Because the second assumption implies that typically the higher-
earnings spouse takes custody of all the children, whereas the first assumption implies that typically the lower-
earnings spouse gets the kids, our assumption of an equal split lies in between these two extremes.
22Our approach to the calculation of marriage penalties is closely related to the so-called “Resource Pooling
Approach” (see Bull et al., 1999). Our calculations do not include unearned income and therefore capture only
the marriage penalty arising from the tax-transfer treatment of earned income.
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is the result of an individual income tax combined with fairly small social assistance benefits
that are available only to single parents. Spain tends to subsidize marriage for couples without
children but penalize it for couples with children. In France, marriage subsidies are considerable
for higher-income families.23
6 Conclusion
The standard Mirrleesian theory of optimal income taxation assumes that all tax payers and
transfer recipients live in single-person households. In reality, most individuals live in families
formed around couples, and the tax-transfer rules applying to couples are often diﬀerent from
the rules applying to single individuals. A number of recent papers have attempted to generalize
the theory of optimal income taxation to explicitly deal with couples. Instead of characterizing
the optimal tax-transfer treatment of families, this paper characterizes the actual tax-transfer
treatment of couples and identifies welfare-improving reforms for 15 European countries.
We have considered three aspects of a tax-transfer system for couples: the form of jointness,
the distortion of second-earner labor supply, and the size of marriage penalties. A general
insight from the analysis is that the transfer system is a crucial element in understanding and
evaluating redistribution schemes aﬀecting married couples. For example, it is the presence of
family-based and means-tested transfer programs that explains the observation in many countries
of negative jointness, i.e. a negative relationship between the eﬀective tax rate on one person and
the earnings of the spouse. Interestingly, negative jointness is in accordance with prescriptions
from the recent optimal tax literature (Kleven, Kreiner and Saez, 2007, 2008). At the same
time, family-based transfers tend to create substantial marriage penalties at the bottom of the
distribution, which raise issues pertaining to fairness and to some extent eﬃciency.
Our analysis of tax-transfer distortions at the extensive margin of labor supply suggests
that the eﬀective taxation of secondary earners relative to primary earners is too high given
the empirical evidence on participation elasticities. Simple revenue-neutral reforms that shift
some of the tax burden from two-earner couples to one-earner and/or zero-earner couples would
reduce the distortion of second-earner labor supply and may generate substantial welfare gains.
In fact, for some countries, a tax cut for secondary earners may realistically pay for itself and
give rise to a Pareto improvement. For countries where Laﬀer eﬀects are not present, a tax cut
for two-earner families does require a higher tax on other couples, but the required tax increase
23An additional important factor determining marriage penalties are housing benefits. In results not reported
here, we have calculated marriage penalties under alternative assumptions about housing costs following separa-
tion. For example, if rental costs for each spouse are at the same level as the combined rental costs of the couple
(reflecting economies of scale in two-person households), the size of marriage penalties are considerably aﬀected
in some countries (in particular, the UK, Ireland, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands).
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tends to be reasonably small. In a majority of countries, it is possible to transfer 1 euro to
two-earner couples by taking away less than 12 a euro from other couples.
Appendix A: Derivation of eqs (6) and (7)
We derive the inter-household utility trade-oﬀ under the assumption that there are no households
with only the secondary earner working either before or after a reform. To ensure that this is
consistent with household optimization we must restrict the distribution of the fixed costs of
work for secondary earners. In terms of Figure 2, we must make sure that a marginal reform
does not induce any families to position themselves in area ∅. We denote by Vh (·) the indirect
family utility function, which depends on the work status of the two spouses. The conditions we
will impose on the distribution of fixed costs of work for the secondary earner amount to saying
that, following a marginal reform, the indirect utility is greater for all families if they are in
area 0 of Figure 2 than if they are in area ∅. A suﬃcient condition makes sure that no couples
have a high fixed cost of work for the primary earner qp and at the same time a relatively low
qs for the secondary earner.
Let q¯hs (0) ≡ Vh (0, 1)− V (0, 0) be the gain from secondary earner entry for household type
h when the primary earner is not working, and let q¯hp (1) ≡ Vh (1, 1) − Vh (0, 1) be the gain
from primary earner entry when the secondary earner is already working. Further, let qhp ≡
min
©
q¯hp (1) , q¯hp
ª
where q¯hp is determined by (4). We will assume a lower bound on the secondary
earner fixed costs of work depending on the primary earner’s fixed costs of work, qhs (qp), such
that Ph
³
qhs (qp) |qp
´
≡ 0. The lower bound assumption is
qhs (qp) > q
h
s (0) for qp > q
h
p . (A-1)
The reason for the two diﬀerent thresholds for the primary earner is that we must consider both
the potential movement from area 2 to area ∅ and from area 0 to area ∅ in Figure 2.
With this assumption, there will be no households with only the secondary earner working
either before or after marginal reforms. Government revenue can then be written as
R =
X
h
Nh
"Z q¯hp
0
Z q¯hs
qhs (qp)
T
³
zhp , z
h
s , θ
´
ph (qs |qp ) fh (qp) dqsdqp
+
Z q¯hp
0
Z ∞
q¯hs
T
³
zhp , 0, θ
´
ph (qs |qp ) ph (qs |qp ) fh (qp) dqsdqp
+
Z ∞
q¯hp
Z ∞
qhs (qp)
T (0, 0, θ) ph (qs |qp ) fh (qp) dqsdqp
#
=
X
h
h
T
³
zhp , z
h
s , θ
´
Eh2 + T
³
zhp , 0, θ
´
Eh1 + T (0, 0, θ)E
h
0
i
, (A-2)
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where Eh2 is the number of two-earner households of type h, or equivalently, the number of
working secondary earners of type h, Eh1 is the number of one-earner households of type h, and
Eh0 is the number of type h households without any labor force attachment.
The eﬀect of a small reform, dθ, on government revenue is given by
dR
dθ
=
X
h
∙
∂Th (1, 1)
∂θ
Eh2 +
∂Th (1, 0)
∂θ
Eh1 +
∂Th (0, 0)
∂θ
Eh0
+Th (1, 1)
dEh2
dθ
+ Th (1, 0)
dEh1
dθ
+ Th (0, 0)
dEh0
dθ
¸
=
X
h
∙
∂Th (1, 1)
∂θ
Eh2 +
∂Th (1, 0)
∂θ
Eh1 +
∂Th (0, 0)
∂θ
Eh0
+ [Th (1, 1)− Th (1, 0)]
dEh2
dθ
+ [Th (1, 0)− Th (0, 0)]
µ
dEh1
dθ
+
dEh2
dθ
¶¸
, (A-3)
because
dEh0
dθ
= −
µ
dEh1
dθ
+
dEh2
dθ
¶
.
The first three terms in (A-3) reflect mechanical eﬀects while the last two terms capture the
eﬀects of the behavioral responses. The mechanical revenue eﬀects are simply the direct eﬀects
on tax revenue with unchanged behavior. The behavioral responses constitute new entry of
secondary earners (term 4) as well as new entry by primary earners (term 5).
The employment eﬀects of the reform can be expressed using the participation elasticities
from the main text. The change in total employment among couples is
dEh1
dθ
+
dEh2
dθ
=
∂Eh1
∂q¯hp
dq¯hp
dθ
= − ∂E
h
1
∂zhp
¡
1− ahp
¢zhp ∂ahp∂θ = − 11− ahp ∂a
h
p
∂θ
ηhpE
h
1 , (A-4)
where we have used
∂ahp
∂θ
=
µ
∂Th (1, 0)
∂θ
− ∂Th (0, 0)
∂θ
¶
/zhp (0) . (A-5)
The change in secondary employment is
dEh2
dθ
=
∂Eh2
∂q¯hs
dq¯hs
dθ
= − ∂E
h
2
∂zhs (1− ahs )
zhs
∂ahs
∂θ
= − 1
1− ahs
∂ahs
∂θ
ηhsE
h
2 , (A-6)
where use is made of
∂ahs
∂θ
=
µ
∂Th (1, 1)
∂θ
− ∂Th (1, 0)
∂θ
¶
/zhs (A-7)
Using (A-4) and (A-6) we can rewrite (A-3) as
dR
dθ
=
X
h
∙
∂Th (1, 1)
∂θ
Eh2 +
∂Th (1, 0)
∂θ
Eh1 +
∂Th (0, 0)
∂θ
Eh0
¸
−
X
h
"
ahp
1− ahp
∂ahp
∂θ
ηhpz
h
pE
h
1 +
ahs
1− ahs
∂ahs
∂θ
ηhsz
h
sE
h
2
#
.
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Reform A. The first reform has
∂Th (1, 0)
∂θ
=
∂Th (0, 0)
∂θ
=
∂T (1, 0)
∂θ
> 0,
∂Th (1, 1)
∂θ
=
∂T (1, 1)
∂θ
< 0 ∀h,
where the tax increase to one- and no-earner families is determined endogenously. Because the
reform is purely redistributive, government revenue must remain unchanged,dRdθ = 0, implying
−∂T (1, 0)
∂θ
=
∂T (1,1)
∂θ E2
³
1−
P
h
Eh2
E2
ahs
1−ahs
ηhs
´
N −E2
P
h
Eh2
E2
³
1− ahs
1−ahs
ηhs
´ ,
where E2 =
P
hE
h
2 is the total number of two-earner households in the economy and where we
have used (A-7). From the envelope theorem and the marginal nature of the reform, monetary
gains and losses are simply the direct changes in tax liabilities. Because all two-earner couples
gain and all zero- and one-earner couples lose, we have
ΨA = −
−
P
h
∂T (1,0)
∂θ
¡
Nh −Eh2
¢
−
P
h
∂T (1,1)
∂θ E
h
2
=
−∂T (1,0)∂θ (N −E2)
∂T (1,1)
∂θ E2
=
(N −E2)
³
1−
P
h
Eh2
E2
ahs
1−ahs
ηhs
´
N −E2
P
h
Eh2
E2
³
1− ahs
1−ahs
ηhs
´ .
By inserting e2 ≡ E2/N and eh2 ≡ Eh2 /E2, we obtain expression (6).
Reform B. The second reform implies
∂Th (0, 0)
∂θ
= 0,
∂Th (1, 0)
∂θ
=
∂T (1, 0)
∂θ
> 0,
∂Th (1, 1)
∂θ
=
∂T (1, 1)
∂θ
< 0 ∀h,
again with the tax increase for two-earner couples exogenously given. We find
−∂T (1, 0)
∂θ
=
∂T (1,1)
∂θ E2
³
1−
P
h
Eh2
E2
ahs
1−ahs
ηhs
´
E1
³
1−
P
h
Eh1
E1
ahp
1−ahp
ηhp
´
+
P
hE
h
2
ahs
1−ahs
ηhs
,
where E1 =
P
hE
h
1 is the number of one-earner households and where we have used eqs (A-5)
and (A-7) as well as the fact that only primary earners in one-earner couples respond to the
reform. The trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency equals ΨB = −
−∂T (1,1)∂θ E2
−∂T (1,0)∂θ E1
. By inserting the
derivatives from above and the definitions e1 ≡ E1/N , eh1 = Eh1 /E1, e2 ≡ E2/N and eh2 ≡ Eh2 /E2,
we obtain expression (7).
Appendix B: The intensive-extensive model
We introduce intensive responses by allowing individuals to choose working hours subject to
the costs of working time given by vp (zp/np) for primary earners and vs (zs/ns) for secondary
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earners, where z/n is working time for an individual with earnings z and innate ability n. The
household utility function is now given by
u (c, zp, zs) = c− npvp
µ
zp
np
¶
− nsvs
µ
zs
ns
¶
− qp · 1 (zp > 0)− qs · 1 (zs > 0) .
Conditional on working, the primary earner chooses working hours according to
1−mhp (l) = v0p
Ã
zhp (l)
nhp
!
for l = 0, 1,
where mhp (·) ≡ T 0p is the marginal tax rate faced by the primary earner, which may depend
on the work status of the secondary earner. Thus, l = 1 denotes a working spouse and l = 0
represents a non-working secondary earner. Similarly, the number of working hours for the
secondary earners conditional on participation satisfies
1−mhs = v0s
µ
zhs
nhs
¶
,
where mhs ≡ T 0s denotes the marginal tax rate for the secondary earner (which does not depend
on the work status of the primary earner because a working secondary earner is always married
to a working primary earner). Household behavior along the intensive margin is captured by
the intensive elasticities
εhp (l) =
1−mhp (l)
zhp (l)
∂zhp (l)
∂
£
1−mhp (l)
¤ for l = 0, 1, εhs = 1−mhszhs ∂z
h
s
∂(1−mhs )
,
which give the change in earnings in response to a change in the net-of-tax rate rates for the
primary and the secondary earner, respectively. Since the marginal tax rates of an individual
may now depend on spousal income, so may the choice of earnings. In particular, the earnings
of the primary earner are likely to change when the secondary earner enters the labor market.
Behavior along the extensive margin is governed by the exact same logic as in the simpler
model: the primary earner in household h enters whenever entry increases the family’s utility,
i.e., when Vh (1, 0)−V (0, 0) ≥ qp. Similarly, the secondary earner in household h enters whenever
Vh (1, 1)−Vh (1, 0) ≥ qs.24 Compared to the simpler model, the correct definition of the secondary
earner participation tax rate now includes the tax implications of the change in primary earnings,
i.e., ahs = T
¡
zhp (1) , zhs , θ
¢
− T
¡
zhp (0) , 0, θ
¢
/zhs .25
24Assumption (A-1) is again suﬃcient to solve the double screening problem.
25 In the empirical simulations, we are forced to assume that primary earnings remain unchanged when the
secondary earner enters.
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The definition of government revenue R is unchanged. The change in R as a result of the
reform, dθ, is
dR
dθ
=
X
h
∙
∂Th [1, 1]
∂θ
Eh2 +
∂Th [1, 0]
∂θ
Eh1 +
∂Th (0, 0)
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Eh0
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dEh2
dθ
+ [Th (1, 0)− Th (0, 0)]
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dEh1
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+
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¶
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Eh1
#
. (A-8)
As before, the employment eﬀects can be rewritten using elasticities to find
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Reform C. The details of the reform are
∂mhp (1)
∂θ
=
∂Th (0, 0)
∂θ
= 0,
∂mhp (0)
∂θ
= τ =⇒ ∂Th (1, 0)
∂θ
= τzhp (0) ,
∂mhs
∂θ
= −t =⇒ ∂Th (1, 1)
∂θ
= −tzhs ∀h,
where t > 0 is exogenous while τ is endogenously determined by government budget neutrality,
dR = 0. This implies
τ =
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h
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Using this expression, the trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency becomes
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where shp ≡ zhp (0)Ehp /
¡P
h z
h
p (0)Ehp
¢
is the share of all earnings in one-earner families that
accrues to households of type h, and shs ≡ zhsEhs /
P
h z
h
sEhs is the share of all secondary earnings
accruing to household h.
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Country One-earner couples
Two-earner 
couples
One- and two-
earner couples
Austria 0.96 0.87 0.90
Belgium 0.92 0.73 0.78
Denmark 0.83 0.82 0.82
Finland 0.65 0.76 0.75
France 0.93 0.74 0.80
Germany 0.91 0.78 0.83
Greece 0.98 0.75 0.90
Ireland 0.96 0.78 0.89
Italy 0.94 0.81 0.88
Luxembourg 0.99 0.77 0.89
Netherlands 0.95 0.88 0.91
Portugal 0.95 0.78 0.85
Spain 0.97 0.73 0.89
Sweden 0.66 0.76 0.75
United Kingdom 0.78 0.83 0.81
Note: Secondary earners are defined as the spouses with the lowest earnings in 
the couples. Source: EUROMOD Microsimulation Model.
Table 1. Share of women among secondary earners
 Participation Tax Participation Tax Relative Tax Relative Participation Relative Earnings
Country Primary Earners Secondary Earners (PE / SE)  ( PE / SE )  ( PE / SE )
Austria 0.63 0.36 1.72 1.66 2.18
Belgium 0.73 0.74 0.98 1.38 1.95
Denmark 0.73 0.53 1.38 1.13 1.74
Finland 0.60 0.36 1.65 1.05 1.66
France 0.85 0.63 1.35 1.53 1.67
Germany 0.63 0.51 1.22 1.53 1.99
Greece 0.27 0.28 0.97 3.13 1.61
Ireland 0.54 0.44 1.22 2.55 2.18
Italy 0.35 0.46 0.77 2.15 1.51
Luxembourg 0.50 0.32 1.54 2.52 2.25
Netherlands 0.56 0.44 1.28 1.68 2.61
Portugal 0.37 0.41 0.90 1.74 1.56
Spain 0.34 0.41 0.83 3.25 1.61
Sweden 0.66 0.51 1.28 1.07 1.53
United Kingdom 0.56 0.20 2.79 1.47 2.20
Note: The first two columns list the average effective participation tax rates for primary earners in one-earner couples and secondary earners in 
two-earner families, respectively. Colums 4 shows relative participation rates of primary and secondary earners and column 5 lists the relative 
average earnings of primary and secondary earners conditional on working. The calculation of the tax rates is descibed in the text. Source: 
EUROMOD Microsimulation Model.
Table 2. Participation tax rates and labor market outcomes
ηp = 0.1 ηs = 0.5 ηp = 0.1 ηs = 0.7 ηp = 0.3 ηs = 0.3 ηp = 0.1 ηs = 0.5
Country A B A B A B A B
Austria 0.32 0.48 0.18 0.26 0.51 No Gainers 0.38 0.67
Belgium
Denmark 0.01 0.01 0.12 No Gainers 0.01 0.02
Finland 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.26 No Gainers 0.18 0.10
France 0.16 No Gainers
Germany 0.14 0.16 0.35 No Gainers 0.21 0.27
Greece 0.61 0.65 0.48 0.50 0.76 0.99 0.60 0.63
Ireland 0.27 0.31 0.06 0.07 0.52 1.73 0.30 0.39
Italy 0.33 0.32 0.14 0.13 0.55 0.80 0.34 0.34
Luxembourg 0.43 0.53 0.27 0.32 0.62 1.66 0.54 0.69
Netherlands 0.25 0.31 0.11 0.12 0.46 3.21 0.28 0.37
Portugal 0.28 0.29 0.12 0.12 0.50 0.85 0.38 0.39
Spain 0.46 0.48 0.28 0.29 0.66 0.89 0.45 0.47
Sweden 0.07 0.03 0.20 No Gainers 0.07 0.04
United Kingdom 0.58 0.77 0.46 0.56 0.72 No Gainers 0.65 1.03
No Losers No Losers
Note: The trade-off is calculated using formula (6) in the text for reform A and formula (7) for reform B. ηp is the participation 
elasticity of primary earners (PE) and ηs is the participation elasticity of secondary earners (SE). Note that the primary earner 
elasticity does not affect the trade-off in reform A. In scenarios 1-3, the elasticities are the same for all income groups. In scenario 
4, earnings responses are concentrated at the lower end of the income distribution. Specifically, ηp is 0.3 for primary earners in the 
lowest quintile of the PE earnings distribution (PEq1), 0.1 for PEq2 and PEq3, and 0 for PEq4 and PEq5. For secondary earners, 
the elasticity scenario is 1 for the lowest quintile of the SE earnings distribution (SEq1), 0.8 for SEq2, 0.5 for SEq3, 0.2 for SEq4 
and 0 for SEq5. The average elasticities are listed above the results. Source: Authors' own calculations based on the EUROMOD 
microsimulation model.
No Losers
No Losers
Table 3. Inter-household utility trade-off for reforms A and B
Scenario 1
No Losers No Losers
Scenario 4
No Losers
No Losers No Losers
No Losers
Scenario 3
Elasticity ProfileConstant Elasticity
Scenario 2
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Country εp = εs = 0 εp = εs = 0.1 εp = 0  εs = 0.2
Austria 0.42 0.34 0.18
Belgium No Losers No Losers No Losers
Denmark 0.01 No Losers No Losers
Finland 0.05 0.03 0.00
France No Losers No Losers No Losers
Germany 0.11 0.00 No Losers
Greece 0.66 0.63 0.51
Ireland 0.26 0.15 0.01
Italy 0.30 0.23 0.11
Luxembourg 0.44 0.34 0.17
Netherlands 0.29 0.21 0.09
Portugal 0.18 0.11 0.03
Spain 0.48 0.45 0.35
Sweden 0.03 0.01 No Losers
United Kingdom 0.66 0.65 0.51
ηp = 0.1            ηs = 0.5
Constant Elasticity
Table 4. Inter-household utility trade-off for reform C
Note: The trade-off is calculated using formula (A-9) in Appendix D. ηp is the participation 
elasticity of primary earners (PE) and ηs is the participation elasticity of secondary earners 
(SE). Similarly, εp is the intensive elasticity of the PE and εs is the intesive elasticity of the 
SE. The participation elasticities are set at 0.1 for ηp and 0.5 for ηs in all scenarios. The 
elasticities never vary with income groups.  Source: Authors' own calculations based on 
the EUROMOD microsimulation model.
Family Income Percentiles AT BE DK FI FR GE GR IR IT LU NL PT SP SW UK
PE 0 - SE 0 5141 9770 7077 3676 14472 2387 1608 2224 0 7433 13549 0 0 10187 4696
PEp10 - SE 0 9353 10090 11640 6668 13059 5138 619 9156 -3234 12474 13375 2276 69 10495 7586
PEp10 - SEp10 7167 9712 11153 5116 7343 6573 762 10711 -1025 10624 11762 1125 837 5987 7782
PEp50 - SE 0 9353 6933 18148 12114 12096 9040 518 9999 -2307 10288 13632 2151 7 17444 13234
PEp50 - SEp10 7178 7071 11858 5611 6433 7692 615 7831 -686 4672 12343 593 849 5730 9406
PEp50 - SE p50 496 -575 9411 1055 2404 2267 57 3561 256 -3169 8814 355 1669 752 6066
PEp90 - SE 0 9353 6101 21936 14040 7308 8173 588 14318 -935 3249 12195 -187 7 17987 20780
PEp90 - SEp10 7294 6110 13457 7691 1962 7182 686 13868 -158 -2967 10713 -1621 1809 5730 17130
PEp90 - SEp50 496 -1274 10060 1055 -1192 3027 73 7023 294 -8042 6663 -1156 2821 1938 13790
PEp90 - SEp90 697 -575 6259 737 -288 955 244 5839 -422 -1027 7942 651 3316 0 2108
Note: The table shows marriage penalties on an annual basis for hypothetical families in 2007 Euros. The calculations are done for different earnings levels for 
the primary and secondary earner and the earnings levels refer to percentiles in the earnings distribution for primary and secondary earners, respectively. The 
marriage penalty is calculated as the change in a couple's combined (net-)tax liability upon separation. It is assumed that all individuals occupy rental housing. 
Following separation, each spouse is assumed to bear rental costs amounting to 50% of the costs in the married scenario. Further, each spouse retains 
custody of one child. 1998 figures are converted to 2007 euros using national indices of compensation per employee. Exchange rates are, respectively, the 
irrevocable euro exchange rates (12 euro countries) and 2007 average annual exchange rates (non-euro countries: Denmark, Sweden, UK). Sources: 
EUROMOD microsimulation model, OECD Economic Outlook 82, and Danmarks Nationalbank.
Table 5. Annual marriage penalties in 2007 euros for families with two children, 1998
Figure 1. Participation tax rates of secondary earners (in percent) at selected earnings levels as a function of 
primary earnings (vingtiles) for couples with two children
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Note: Each figure shows the participation tax rate of the secondary earner (SE) in percent as a function of the earnings of the primary earner (PE), depicted by vingtile group 
in the PE earnings distribution. The graphs are shown for four different SE earnings levels: the lowest vingtile (SEp5), the lowest decile (SEp10), the median(SEp50), and 
the top decile (SEp90) of the SE earnings distribution. Source: EUROMOD microsimulation model.
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Figure 2: The double-deviation problem.
Table A1: Summary of taxes on workers
Income Tax7 SSC (employee) SSC (employer) and Payroll Tax
lowest/highest 
tax band limit1,2
lowest/highest 
rate [%] main tax credit
1 tax unit family-related tax provisions
thres-
hold1
rate [%] ceiling1
tax 
deductible
thres-
hold1
rate [%] ceiling1 taxable
Austria 17/231 21/504 rates 5 individual
deduction for single earners; 
tax credits for lone parents 15 18.8 193 yes
15
-
21.3
4.5
193
- no
2nd earner: phase-out of single-earner 
credit
Belgium 24/318 25/557 rates - individual
parts of taxable income 
transferrable to spouse; 
additional tfa for children 
and lone parents
- 11.9 - yes - 45.4 - no
2nd earner: phase-out of amount 
transferrable from higher-earning 
spouse
Denmark 12/100 40/59
4
3 rates
- individual unused deductions transferrable to spouse -
9
+ flat amount - yes -
2
+ flat amount - no
Finland 35/223 24/56
4
6 rates
- individual -58
7.6
0.5 - yes - 24.5 - no
earned income tax allowance (20% of 
earnings above 11)
phase-out of earned income tax and 
basic allowances (starting at earnings > 
31 and 76 respectively)
France 30/336 11/546 rates - family
-
-
-
136
-
0.9
9.6
2.84
3.6
7.6
-
136
409
545
-
yes
yes
yes
yes
partly
-
-
-
136
19.8
13.4
4.1
5.3
-
136
409
545
no reduced employer contributions rates for wages < 130% MW.
Germany
30
133
252
27.3
37.2
55.75
-
married 
couple 
(individual 
optional)
choice of tfa or child benefit 15 7.713.4
156
208 yes 15
7.7
13.4
156
208 no
Greece 56/478 5/455 rates
max. 15% of 
accepted hshld. 
expenditure
individual 0.9-1.8 non-refundable tax credit per child - 15.9
200; 
none for 
new jobs
yes - 28.2
200; 
none for 
new jobs
no
Ireland 25/80 24/462 rates -
married 
couple 
(individual 
optional)
- 4186
4.5
2.3
193
- no
-
112
-
8.5
12.0
4.0
12
231
231
no no tax if income below 33 (higher limit if children)
tax-free status phased out above the 33 
limit.
Italy 0/118 19/465 rates up to 6 individual
up to 2 tax credit for each 
dependent family member
-
56
9.04
1
- yes - 33.04 - no
phase-out of main tax credit;
2nd earner: phase-out of tax credit for 
dependent spouse;
Luxembourg 25/250 6/4717 rates -
married 
couple
deductions for lone parents 
and care expenditure; 3 tax 
credit per child
- 13.1 259 yes - 14.64 259 no
2nd earner: additional tax deduction if 
both spouses work
Netherlands 20/212 36
8/60
3 rates
- individual additional tfa for lone parents
54
-
5.3
1.7
156
105
yes
no
54
-
-
6.4
5.6
7.94
156
105
156
no
yes
no
Portugal 0/490 5
9/40
5 rates
3 married couple
additional 1.5 tax credit per 
child - 11 - no - 23.8 - no
Spain 22/492 20/568 rates 3
family 
(individual 
optional)
up to 2 tax credit per child 
(additional amounts in some 
regions)
46 30.8 177 yes 46 6.4 177 no earning < 55 are tax-exempt
"spike" in METR once above 
exemption limit; phase-out of main tax 
credit adds 5 pct. points to METR
Sweden 4/92 30
4
554
- individual - 3 6.95 121 yes 0.4 33 - no
United 
Kindgom
29/220 20/403 rates - individual
2 tax credit for married 
couples; 13 tax deduction for 
lone parents
23 8.4 to 10 177 no
2310
40
56
76
3
5
7
10
- no
features increasing METR and PTRfeatures reducing METR and PTR
Appreviations: SSC = social security contribution; METR = marginal effective tax rate; PTR = participation tax rate; tfa = tax free allowance; MW = statutory minimum wage.
10 all  earnings are subject to the applicable rate once they exceed these threshold levels
Explanatory Notes: Reference year is 1998. Except where noted, all information is for private-sector employees with no other income and not claiming itemised expenses. Income taxes include local and regional taxes where 
applicable. Multiple lines of SSC entries are shown where payment schedules differ for the different programs (e.g. for pensions, health, unemployment, etc.). Further information, and data for later years, can be found in the 
EUROMOD country reports (www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/documentation/countries/), the OECD Tax Database (www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase) and the OECD series Benefits and Wages 
( www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives) .
6 West Germany
7 including regional income taxes where applicable
8 including pension contributions (same tax base as income tax)
9 effective rate taking into account the allowance of 70% of the tax base for low incomes
1 in % of median gross earnings of primary earners (not including employer social security contributions)
2 after adding any standard tax free allowances, deductions or exemptions available to single employees
3 insurance is voluntary
4 averages: rates differ between municipalities and/or employers
5 including "Solidarity Surplus Tax" for German unification. MTR increases linearly inbetween lower and middle; and middle and top tax band limits.
Table A2: Summary of social benefits available to persons of working-age
Social Assistance Housing Benefit2 Family Benefits3 Employment-conditional Benefits
max. amount1 disregard1
withdrawal 
rate taxable max. amount
1 withdrawal rate amount1 withdrawal rate amount1 work/income conditions withdrawal rate
Austria 52 - 100% IT: noSSC: no - - 5-7 per child
none
(universal payment) - - -
Belgium 53 10 for each working adult 100%
IT: no
SSC: no - - 4-13 per child
none
(universal payment) - - -
Denmark
90
+ housing 
allowance
9 for each 
working adult 100%
IT: yes
SSC: no 11 75%
3-4 per child; higher for lone 
parents
none
(universal payment) - - -
Finland
58
+reasonable 
housing cost
- 100% IT: noSSC: no 34 80%
5-9 per child; plus 2 per 
child for lone parents; plus 
day-care subsidy
none
(universal payment) - - -
France 49 - 100% IT: noSSC: no 20 34%
main benefit: 7 to 12 for 
second & further children; 
special benefits for young 
children
main benefit: 100% once 
income > 174-261 - - -
Germany
474
+ reasonable 
housing costs
4 for each 
working 
family 
member
75-100% IT: noSSC: no
45
(if not receiving 
social assistance)
40%
main benefit: 5-9 per child; 
child-raising allowance for 
very young children: 
additional 5-7
main benefit: none 
(universal payment);
child-raising allowance: 20-
40% once income > 62
- - -
Greece - - - - 0.5-1 per child plus additions for large families
reduced in steps for 
incomes > 65 - - -
Ireland 56
19
(only for 2nd 
earner)
100% IT: noSSC: no 53 100% 3-4 per child
none
(universal payment)
60% of family gross earnings 
exceeding 88 (higher limit for 
larger families)
couple jointly working at 
least 20 hours per week
60% (of gross family 
earnings)
Italy - - - -
3-17 per family member (also 
spouses) depending on family 
type
must work at least 3 days 
per week; reduced 
benefits if working less 
than full-time
reduced in steps for 
family incomes > 73
Luxembourg 64 13 100% IT: yesSSC: reduced
6
(must receive social 
assistance)
100%
8-13 per child; plus 
education allowance for 
children aged 3-
none
(universal payment) - - -
Netherlands 49 - 100%
yes, but max. 
amount is 
shown on net 
basis
6 54% 2-7 per child none(universal payment) - - -
Portugal 59 - 100% IT: noSSC: no 4 per child
reduced to 3 per child once 
income > 71 - - -
Spain 2 for first child, 0.2 for further children 100% once income > 55 - - -
Sweden
35
+reasonable 
housing cost
- 100% IT: noSSC: no 17
33%
(disregard of 18) 4-8 per child
none
(universal payment) - - -
United Kindgom 51 2-4 100% IT: noSSC: no
100% of recognised 
rent; 100% of council 
tax
65% (housing benefit); 
20% (council tax 
benefit)
3-5 per child none(universal payment)
18 + up to 13 per child + 4 if 
working > 30 hours per week; 
only entitled if >= 1 child
at least one person 
working >= 16 hours per 
week
70% of family 
income > 29
1 in % of median gross earnings of primary earners (not including employer social security contributions)
2 cash assistance for privately rented accommodation. Housing benefits may be paid through the social assistance program. In this case, they are already reflected in the social assistance amounts shown in this table.
Abbreviations: IT = income tax; SSC = social security contributions.
4 West Germany
3 in addition to family-related tax concessions shown in the companion table under income tax. Does not include any benefits available for pregnancy, childbirth, parental leave, or childcare benefits.
none at the national level
none at the national level
Explanatory Notes: Reference year is 1998. Rules for social benefits can vary between regions or municipalities. Where social assistance is subject to job-search or other conditions (e.g. in Denmark), it is assumed that both spouses 
comply with the relevant requirements. All information is for families with two children. IT = income tax; SSC = social security contributions. Further information, and data for later years, can be found in the EUROMOD country reports 
(www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/documentation/countries/ ), the OECD Tax Database (www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase ) and the OECD series Benefits and Wages ( www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives) .
none at the national level none at the national level
see employment-conditional benefits
none at the national level
Country Primary earners Secondary earners PE tax / SE tax
Austria 0.52 0.44 1.19
Belgium 0.65 0.60 1.08
Denmark 0.58 0.54 1.07
Finland 0.54 0.47 1.16
France 0.53 0.53 0.99
Germany 0.54 0.59 0.92
Greece 0.37 0.28 1.32
Ireland 0.43 0.43 1.01
Italy 0.52 0.48 1.07
Luxembourg 0.41 0.44 0.95
Netherlands 0.52 0.47 1.12
Portugal 0.44 0.42 1.03
Spain 0.37 0.32 1.17
Sweden 0.59 0.54 1.09
United Kingdom 0.37 0.31 1.21
Note: Average effective marginal tax rates for primary earners and secondary earners 
conditional on working. Source: EUROMOD Microsimulation Model.
Table A3. Average marginal tax rates
Family Income Percentiles AT BE DK FI FR GE GR IR IT LU NL PT SP SW UK
PE 0 - SE 0 4905 5217 -2990 2066 5907 760 0 2224 0 8110 2443 0 0 10384 2418
PEp10 - SE 0 7510 5319 4966 7263 7306 4008 -24 7069 -1527 13281 6312 1652 -421 14126 4994
PEp10 - SEp10 4875 5684 199 2214 2440 2587 -24 4471 -437 8298 5385 94 0 2251 3336
PEp50 - SE 0 7780 5861 8184 8340 6915 3273 -145 5078 -957 9089 6190 1241 -969 14508 8075
PEp50 - SEp10 5228 6741 264 2224 1485 1913 -145 1235 -456 3201 4886 -317 -127 2251 3587
PEp50 - SE p50 0 1655 0 0 -170 -149 11 -1507 -625 -3827 961 142 0 0 -609
PEp90 - SE 0 8020 6027 8985 9621 1092 -356 0 5922 -1619 3121 8937 -999 -2122 14508 13411
PEp90 - SEp10 5969 6779 1031 3223 -3263 -1468 0 2698 -1207 -3539 7560 -2434 -320 2251 9049
PEp90 - SEp50 0 1954 1464 0 -3262 -5517 106 -1212 -1377 -7801 0 -1169 0 0 3148
PEp90 - SEp90 0 3077 0 0 -1251 -1682 287 0 -1677 -3662 0 638 0 0 -610
Note: The table shows marriage penalties on an annual basis for hypothetical families in 2007 Euros. The calculations are done for different earnings levels for 
the primary and secondary earner and the earnings levels refer to percentiles in the earnings distribution for primary and secondary earners, respectively. The 
marriage penalty is calculated as the change in a couple's combined (net-)tax liability upon separation. It is assumed that all individuals occupy rental housing. 
Following separation, each spouse is assumed to bear rental costs amounting to 50% of the costs in the married scenario. Further, each spouse retains 
custody of one child. 1998 figures are converted to 2007 euros using national indices of compensation per employee. Exchange rates are, respectively, the 
irrevocable euro exchange rates (12 euro countries) and 2007 average annual exchange rates (non-euro countries: Denmark, Sweden, UK). Sources: 
EUROMOD microsimulation model, OECD Economic Outlook 82, and Danmarks Nationalbank.
Table A4. Annual marriage penalties in 2007 euros for families with no children, 1998
Figure A1. Marginal tax rates of secondary earners (in percent) at selected earnings levels as a function of 
primary earnings (vingtiles) for couples with two children
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Note: Each figure shows the marginal tax rate of the secondary earner (SE) in percent as a function of the earnings of the primary earner (PE), depicted by vingtile group in 
the PE earnings distribution. The graphs are shown for four different SE earnings levels: the lowest vingtile (SEp5), the lowest decile (SEp10), the median(SEp50), and the 
top decile (SEp90) of the SE earnings distribution. Source: EUROMOD microsimulation model.
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Figure A2. Participation tax rates of secondary earners (in percent) at selected earnings levels as 
a function of primary earnings (vingtiles) for couples with no children
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Note: Each figure shows the participation tax rate of the SE in percent as a function of the earnings of the PE, depicted by vingtile group in the PE earnings distribution. The 
graphs are shown for four different SE earnings levels: the lowest vingtile (SEp5), the lowest decile (SEp10), the median(SEp50), and the top decile (SEp90) of the SE earnings 
distribution. Source: EUROMOD microsimulation model.
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